To what extent do World Trade Organization rules act as a barrier to international environmental governance?

IntroductionThe gradual opening of the arteries of humanness trade through the World swap Organisation (WTO), while resuscitating planetary economics and organism a symbol of the hyperliberalisation of trade, has been strangling environmental security footfalls (Conca 2000, Lowenfeld 2008 ONeill & fire 2005). The need for an essenceive, robust and objective way to decompose worldwide junks is arguably, in the light of the relentless and inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before (Friedman 1999), stronger than ever and a retreat to the unilateralist ideologies which gave save to the First World War is almost unthinkable now apt(p) our interdependence on each other. The question is toilette the environment be protected while the aggressive expansion of trade continuesThe birth, by accident, of the spheric Agreement on Tariffs and foxiness (GATT) in 1945, was part of an indefatigable private road to combat trade protectionism, discriminatory trade policies and most significantly gird conflict as a means of resolving disputes in the call down of the second world war (Irwin, Mavroidis & Sykes 2008, Lowenfeld 2008, Wilcox 1949). One of the pronounced goals of trade repose is the removal of trade barriers and with the accession of China to the WTO, which replaced the GATT in 1995, the hyperliberalisation of trade is fabrication pace with 153 members and 97% of world trade (Conca 2000, p.484). This unrestricted access, while confessedly positive for economic growth, has been perceived by many commentators as cosmos inimical to the quest for world(a) ecological sustainability as Conca, the most atheistical critic, puts it (Ibid). World Trade Organisation rules have, to a large finale, acted as a barrier to international environmental governance both substantively and procedurally. In monetary value of the national lawfulnesss and the WTO, the destabilization of international environme ntal regimes and procedural rules the WTO has hindered rather than helped environmental initiatives both nationally and internationally. There have been near signs of progress, however, with a sound destroyed report by the join Nations and the WTO in 2010 acknowledging for the first time that some restrictions on the liberalization of trade will be needed to shinny humor change (WTO-UNEP Report 2010) and other commentators discerning a go away towards an accommodation amongst the nonions of free trade and environmental protection (ONeill & burn 2005, p.319). It is also vital to note that Concas strident objections, while relevant, were scripted in the year 2000 after just five years of the WTO and indeed omits one weighty WTO endings. Nevertheless the authors biting critique must be answered and his view is not entirely with aside justification as notwithstanding in 2012The WTO has proven to be profoundly anti-environmental both procedurally and substantively, handin g down environmentally damaging decisions whenever it has had the chance to do so. Fears of a race to a colly bottom be proving prescient, and optimism that trade rules can be greened from within has waned appreciably (Conca 2000, p.484).Part 1WTO rules and the environment WTO/GATT, national laws and decisionsOne of the central objections to the WTO rules in the bowl of environmental policy is that they, in Concas words, to a lower placecut national policies (2000, p.486). Erich Vranes adopts to a greater ex decennaryt(prenominal) mature terminology for this level of interaction which he labels as good as between domestic measures and WTO law (Vranes 2009). Concas objections arise when a national environmental regulation is challenged under WTO rules and, without exception between 1995 and 2000, turn over down an anti-environmental decision (Conca 2000, p.486). There have been six decisions relating to environmental issues under the old GATT regime and just three under the w ise WTO rules (WTO website 2012). The fount which sparked the hostility to the GATT/WTO regimes is the Tuna/Dolphin case (case 1) where dolphins were be caught in tunny nets and dying unnecessarily in the hunt for tuna (Lowenfeld 2008, p.315). The US judicature sought to prohibition all tuna imports from Mexico which brought a dispute dependency proceeding under the old GATT rules under denomination XXIII. Americas defence under article XX (the oecumenical exceptions article) was based on the protection of animal animation and the conservation of exhaustible resources and proved swollen-headed as the Panel found in favour of the Mexicans with the dislodge on tuna contrary to article XI(1) of the GATT and unjustified by obligate XX(b) or (g) (Lowenfeld 2008, p.317). The other cases under the old GATT regime concerned American revenue on gas guzzling cars brought by the EU in October 1994, the supposed son of Tuna/Dolphin where the EU flourishingly challenged the Mari ne mammal Protection Act in June 1994, the father of the Tuna/Dolphin dispute successfully brought by Canada against the USA in February 1982 and finally two successful cases brought by the US against firstly Thailand for the restriction and taxation of cig atomic number 18ttes in November 1990 and second against Canada regarding the exports of herring and salmon (WTO website accessed 2012).Concas powerful criticism was written alone after two WTO decisions on the environment had been handed down and the rules were interpret narrowly firstly unify States Standards for reformulated and conventional gasoline in 1996. In this case, brought by Venezuela and Brazil against the US, measures to ensure imported gasoline complied with air theatrical role restrictions were found to be discriminatory although the WTO panel did emphasize that it was Americas discrimination against imports, which were cogitation to more stringent measures than exports, which crippled their case not that t hey didnt have a defence or indeed a shocking cause. Secondly, in a strikingly similar complaint to the tuna/dolphin decision brought in 1998, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand all challenged US legislation which banned all imports of commercial seafood, pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, to save turtles instead of dolphins join States result Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. Although the US befuddled this case, again by virtue of discriminatory behavior, it is clear that the seeds were sown for a fresh start and as Lowenfeld points out, this appellate decision had sought to wear the conflict between the trade and environment communities (2008, p.323). boostmore, had the US not discriminated, because it is certain that they would have won both on imports of gasoline and prawn and indeed the second decision in the shrimp case confirms this (ONeill & burn down 2005) . This analysis leaves just one WTO decision in the 21st degree centigrade European Communities Measures affecting asbestos and asbestos-containing products. In this trailblazing decision, brought in 2001 by Canada against the EC ban on asbestos products, the WTO panel found, affirmed later on appeal, that France was entitled to ban much(prenominal) harmful products under the very provisions so controversial in the tuna/dolphins casethe Panel found that the French ban could be justified under denomination XX(b). In other words, the measure could be regarded as one which was necessary to protect animal, human, plant life or health. It also met the conditions of the chapeau of Article XX. It therefore ruled in favour of the European Communities. (WTO website accessed 2012)1.2 International environmental regimesAnother powerful criticism leveled at the WTO rules is the perceived parallel at an international level where Conca discerns a WTO-based bane to a broad array of international environment regimes (Conca 2000, p.487). This holy terror, which Vrane labels a s be on a horizontal level between WTO law and state-supported international law including treaty agreements (Vrane 2010), is, according to Conca, brought about because these international environmental regimes often depend on trade related measures for their implementation and bill (2000, p.488). The main problems are firstly that the WTOs existence is having a chilling effect on global semipolitical imagination (Ibid). Conca justifiably points out that the 1994 Amendment to the Basel concourse, which sought to ban the trade in hazardous go offs, may substantially be one of the last to target the trafficking of environmental hazards. The continued political impasse concerning the Kyoto Treaty lends weight to Concas observations although perhaps, in light of the global recession, the international environmental arena is anyway sterile (Rajamani 2008). Secondly Article XI of GATT, which prohibits quantitative import/export restrictions is often cited as being a stumbling bloc k and could well be used as the priming of a WTO challenge against environmental regimes such as the one which exists with find to logging (Conca 2000, p.489). This problem is still a hypothetical one that nonetheless is relevant and demonstrates perhaps that the rules have had a chilling effect on numerous proposed environmental regimes (ONeill & Burns 2005, p.330). Conca cites the example of a young logging regime which failed to materialize at the Seattle conference (ibid). Finally the Basel Convention on hazardous waste is cited by Conca as a plainIneffectiveness and a huge loophole for waste recycling kept the waste tradealive, leading a coalition of developing countries and environmental activists to fight down through the Basel ban at a 1994 conference of the parties. The constant threat of a WTO challenge has inhibited the collection of the national ratifications needed for the amendment to come in into force, and undercuts efforts to use the regime (Conca 2000, p.489 )Part 2 Procedural Rules of the WTO2.1 Burden of induction, preventative principle and Amicus CuriaeFinally the rules of the WTO themselves have been justifiably seen as stacking the deck against those who are struggle for the environment (Lowenfeld 2008, p.327). The burden of create is, as Conca observes, squarely on the shoulders of those contention for environmental precaution (Conca 2000, p.485). The presumption of a violation means that the outgrowth against whom the complaint has been brought, will re alone the charge and the party which is asserting the favorable of a particular claim will bear the burden of proof a rule which is universal to all disputes and not just the environmental issues (Sebastian 2010). Lowenfeld also points to the precautionary principle which dictates thatuncertainty regarding the adverse environmental effects of an activity should not be a bar to adoption of measures to prohibit or otherwise regulate the activity, but that such uncertainty provides an plausive justification for adopting such measures (2008, p.333).The Beef Hormones case is often cited in linkup with this embryonic principle. The Appellate Body held here that this principle was not yet part of customary law but that it was commonsense to weigh the badness of the danger against the degree of wish welllihood that the danger would be enhanced by the challenged activity (Ibid). Lowenfeld suggests that this line of reasoning could lead to the WTO adopting a worst- case scenario parameter which would, quite understandably, undermine environmental protection (Ibid). The author concludes by findthe precautionary principle as formulated by the European friendship seems too harsh. On the one hand, it is susceptible to misuse for purposes of competition and protection on the other, it seems both to overestimate and underestimate science (Ibid at p.334).Further to the burden of proof and the precautionary principle are the Amicus Curiae briefs the closed door proceedings used to make it ticklish for the stakeholders usually so closely intimated with environmental action (charities and so on to participate and are still difficult to surmount. This procedural innovation, which is a creature of statute, has enabled certain organisations to provide opinions to supplement decisions which are often made by lawyers and economists who usually have little cognition of environmental effects (Conca 2000, p.485). Those accommodateting the Amicus Curiae briefs can be WTO members or non-state actors and it is important to note that the acceptance of such briefs is an exercise of discretion on the part of the Panel (Stern 2006). The fact that such briefs have bend more commonplace bring outes Concas arguments a little but, as far-famed above, it is ultimately a question of discretion as to whether an organization is allowed to submit such a brief. What is clear is that the complex ways in which ecosystems can be corrupted do not always fit intimately into the burden of proof system.2.1 Interpretation of Article XX of GATTThe interpretation of this article is key to much of the criticism of the GATT/WTO. In both Tuna-Dolphin and Shrimp-Turtle cases it has been noticed that these general exceptions to GATT provisions has been interpreted narrowly by both GATT and WTO panels respectively (ONeill & Burns 2005, p.325). This narrow interpretation has fuelled a lot of criticism with the panel in Shrimp/Turtle expressly saying that the WTO supports countries who hold such noble goals and that it was because of the USs discriminatory behavior that they held against the US. As noted above, however, the decision in European Communities Measures affecting asbestos and asbestos-containing products could be the beginning of a new era of interpreting the exceptions as they relate to environmental protection. Certainly the WTO has been tippy to the criticism it has received from many quarters about its handling of such cases. Whet her Concas observation that Playing by WTO rules, the first definitive proof of harm will often be irreversible ecosystem collapse is problematic in the current climate and, arguably, about a decade out of touch (2000, p.485).ConclusionIn conclusion the rules of the WTO to a large extent are acting as a barrier to international environmental governance. In wrong of the undermining of national and international laws, the procedural flaws in terms of the burden of proof, the precautionary principle and the amicus curiae briefs as well as the narrow interpretation of article XX, the WTO has a lot of damage to undo in the coming years. Much has been written on this volatile subject and it is clear that Conca (2000) is the most scathing critic. His polemic is out of date, however, and although many of his conclusions are valid his overriding point, that there is an anti-green agenda in the WTO is slowly being unraveled. Indeed as far back as the 1998 Shrimp-Turtle case it has been disc erned by astute commentators like ONeill and Burns that the decision is a pro-environmental one, albeit resulting in ultimate defeat for the USA. The recent joint UN-WTO report (2010) is an indicator of the commission which the WTO is going in and the most recent case involving environmental action, the EU-Canada Asbestos case, confirms that a broader interpretation of article XX can provide positive environmental results. Perhaps the greening of the WTO has begun and no doubt the scathing criticism of authors like Conca had something to do with their new-found green credentials. A proper reform of the WTO rules is required but perhaps the tide has already turned as Barkin observesthe incompatibility between the rules of the international trading regime and the need for responsible management of the global environment is substantially overstated, and that official interpretations of these rules are becoming consistently more environmentally-friendly over time (Barkin 2005, p.334).B ibliographyJournalsConca, Ken (2000) The WTO and the Undermining of Global Environmental Governance inspection of International Political Economy 73 Autumn pp 484 494Rajamani (2008) From Berlin to Bali and beyond Killing Kyoto Softly? International & Comparative Law Quarterly 57(4) pp909-9392.0 BooksBarkin, Samuel.J (2005) The Environment, Trade and International Organisations in Dauvergne, Peter (ed) Handbook of Global Environmental political science Edward Elgar CheltenhamFriedman, Thomas (2000) The Lexus and the Olive Tree Anchor Books UKIrwin, Mavroidis & Sykes (2008) The Genesis of the GATT Cambridge University tug world(a)Lowenfeld, Andreas F. International Economic Law (2008) (2nd ed) Oxford Uni Press Oxford, New York.ONeill, Kate & Burns, C.G William (2005) Trade Liberalization and Global Environmental Governance the Potential for Conflict in Dauvergne, Peter (ed) Handbook of Global Environmental Politics Edward Elgar CheltenhamSebastian, Thomas (2010) The law of permis sible WTO retaliation in Bown and Pauwelyn (eds) The Law, Economics and Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute settlement Cambridge University Press worldwideStern, Brigitte (2006) The emergence of non-state actors in international commercial disputes through WTO appellate Body case-law in Sacerdoti, Yanovich and Bohanes (eds) The WTO at ten The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System Cambridge University Press worldwide new wave den Bossche, Peter (2008). The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, UK Cambridge University PressVranes, Erich (2009) Trade and the Environment Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO law and legal Theory Oxford University Press Oxford3.0 StatuteEndangered Species ActGATT 1947 Articles XXII and XXIIIMarine mammal Protection Act 1972Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes4.0 WebsitesWTO, WTO and UNEP rear a report explaining for the first time the connections between trade and climate change, 26 J une 2009, Press/559. UNEP issued an identical press release on the same day, usable at www.wto.org/english/news.e/pres09_e/pr559_e.htm.WTO website accessed on 2nd February and available from http//www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_e.htm5.0 DecisionsGATT United States Taxes on Automobiles, impression not adopted, circulated on 11 October 1994. Case brought by EU. United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, son of tuna-dolphin, opinion not adopted, circulated on 16 June 1994. Case brought by EU. United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, the tuna-dolphin case, ruling not adopted, circulated on 3 September 1991. Case brought by Mexico, etc. Thailand Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, ruling adopted on 7 November 1990. Case brought by US. Canada Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, ruling adopted on 22 March 1988. Case brought by US. United States Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products f rom Canada, ruling adopted on 22 February 1982. Case brought by Canada.WTO European Communities Measures affecting asbestos and asbestos-containing products. WTO case No. 135. notion adopted on 5 April 2001. Case brought by Canada. United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, the shrimp-turtle case. WTO case Nos. 58 and 61. control adopted on 6 November 1998. Case brought by India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU. Ruling adopted on 21 November 2001. Case brought by Malaysia. United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO case Nos. 2 and 4. Ruling adopted on 20 May 1996. Case brought by Venezuela and Brazil.